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Abstract
Migrants can lower cross-border investment barriers, help investors by
providing information about their homeland and reduce transaction costs by
sharing expertise on regulations, customs and procedures. In addition to gen-
erating these well-known networking effects, migrants can also provide valuable
information about local finance, thereby easing the credit constraints foreign
investors faced during the 2007 financial crisis. This paper sheds new light
on the underlying mechanisms through which migration may affect foreign in-
vestment in the migrant’s homeland by distinguishing between the effects on
FDI’s intensive and extensive margins. Gravity estimates for 140 countries for
the period 2003–2012 suggest that migrants exert a positive effect on bilateral
FDI. However, financial constraints moderate this effect, primarily through
the extensive margin. Additionally, quantile regression reveals that the in-
teraction between migration and credit constraints is significant only for the
lower levels of FDI. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the
interplay among migration, financial constraints and FDI.
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1 Introduction
“On 2015, July 6, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang invited more than 450 Chinese
business leaders from around the world to Beijing. He asked them to help support
China’s economy, saying that overseas Chinese are the key to the nation’s future as
they form a bridge between China and the outside world” (The Nation, Thailand’s
Independent Newspaper, 2015, 20th July).
It is not uncommon that policymakers support their diaspora as ambassadors
for prospective foreign investors. This evidence comes as an acknowledgement that
developing countries may benefit from entrepreneurial migrants who establish busi-
nesses abroad. For instance, the first foreign company to establish in modern China
was Thailand CP Group, founded by Chinese emigrants to Thailand. All the Chinese
diaspora in South East Asia (often labelled as the Bamboo Network) illustrates how
migrants have shaped foreign direct investment (FDI) in their home countries, but
it is not the only case. Morocco has implemented a plan to channel migrants’ money
transfers through the formal banking system, while Turkey has encouraged migrants
to invest back home (Eckstein, 2013). These policies highlight the governments’ faith
in the existence of multiple effects of migrants on their native economies.
This paper focuses on the role of migrants in promoting FDI. Since Gould (1994)
published his seminal work, extensive research has documented a positive association
between ethnic networks and international trade. Most of this literature focuses on
the so-called network channel. In other words, the fact that migrants share useful
knowledge about their home countries helps exporters to reduce transaction costs
and therefore enhances bilateral trade. In contrast, there has been little research on
the link between migrants and foreign direct investment (FDI).
Despite this lack of research, however, FDI activities face larger information asym-
metries than international trade transactions, which would imply that networks play
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a more important role in bilateral FDI than in trade (see Tong, 2005; Aubry et al.,
2014). Javorcik et al. (2011) emphasized that FDI implies a long-term investment
and therefore requires a wider variety of information about the market, legal frame-
work and business structure in the host country. FDI’s long-term nature explains why
some authors argue that FDI flows are more sensitive to information frictions than
investment portfolio equity and debt securities are (Daude and Fratzscher, 2008).
Related to this issue, several authors have argued that since FDI decisions involve
higher fixed costs than exports do, financial constraints are likely to constitute a key
issue in FDI (Alfaro et al., 2004; Buch et al., 2014). In fact, since the sudden halt in
FDI flows in the aftermath of the Great Recession, research focusing on the effect of
financial frictions in multinational investment has emerged. Moreover, casual evid-
ence suggests that financial crises also affect the way information and resources are
spread through informal networks1.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we consider migrants born in
county j but living in country i as a factor determining FDI flows from country i to
country j. Particularly, we consider that migrants reduce the marginal cost related
to the information transfer between headquarters and affiliates. Capital is just one
of many factors transferred from the headquarters to an affiliate in a foreign loca-
tion. We build on the idea of headquarter services (Helpman, 1984) to develop a
model in which the migrant’s information reduces the marginal cost of transferring
headquarter services (e.g., management, financial or marketing services). In essence,
information on foreign tastes, demand preferences, management style and the foreign
banking system reduces the headquarter’s risk when undertaking foreign endeavours.
Second, this paper provides new insights into the FDI–migration link, stressing the
1According to Chen (2004), before the 1997 Asian financial crises, business relationships in the
Bamboo Network were more frequently based on trust and family ties than on contracts. However,
after the crises, network ties seem to weaken their effect in favour of more conventional channels.
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role of the aforementioned financial frictions. More specifically, we examine the mod-
erating role of banking crises in the FDI–migration link. If part of the information
provided by migrants relates to finance (e.g., alternative sources of credit and foreign
banks), financial constraints arising from systemic banking crises should interfere in
the otherwise positive effect of migrants.
We develop a stylized model, in the spirit of Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2008)
and Manova (2013). The model offers several testable empirical predictions consist-
ent with our previous argument. Our empirical strategy is to estimate an extended
gravity equation. We include the number of migrants and their interaction with a
systemic financial crisis (i.e., extreme financial friction that shocks an economy) as
additional explanatory variables of FDI. We draw upon a database covering bilateral
greenfield investments from 2003 to 2012. By doing so, we disentangle the effects of
the explanatory variables on the volume and number of FDI projects (intensive and
extensive margins, respectively).
Our results provide evidence that migrants from country j (FDI host country)
have a positive and significant effect on bilateral FDI directed towards their home-
land (for both intensive and extensive margins). Our estimates also indicate the
existence of two offsetting effects of financial constraints on the effects on migrants.
On the one hand, financial frictions in the source country of investment increase
the positive effect of migrants. This would seem to suggest that when traditional
channels fail (as is the case in a banking crisis) migrants might provide information
about alternative financial possibilities in their homeland. On the other hand, this
effect is lower when banking crises occur in the host country of investment since the
information that migrants transmit about their homeland is likely to become distor-
ted by the financial collapse and its aftermath (e.g., changes in the financial sector
due to mergers, bankruptcies or new policies).
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Moreover, information provided by migrants is likely to be more relevant when
headquarter services are more important, as it is the case with small FDI projects,
especially in situations of financial distress. Hence, we also perform quantile regres-
sion analysis to examine whether the incidence of migration depends on FDI levels.
Results obtained confirm this hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 briefly sum-
marizes the existing literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. Section
4 explains the data and empirical methodology. Section 5 discusses results. Finally,
section 6 offers conclusions.
2 Background
New approaches in the literature stress that uncertainty and imperfect inform-
ation impose barriers to trade and investment from MNEs (see Buch et al., 2006;
Aubry et al., 2014). Based on the theory of networks, these approaches suggest
that both emigrants and immigrants have positive and significant effects on bilateral
trade and FDI flows. But whereas scholars have extensively analysed the relation-
ship between migration and trade, the FDI–migration link has received less attention
until recently.
FDI and migration may interact in several ways. For example by acting as an
information-revealing network, migrants may stimulate foreign investment. This
could happen, for example, when people living abroad demand products or services
from their home country and companies try to satisfy these needs by investing abroad
(Javorcik et al., 2011). Thus, migrants help companies to identify business opportun-
ities, local tastes and foreign preferences. In this sense, migrants may help to identify
new economic opportunities in their homeland through personal ties between expat-
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riates and business communities. In fact, cultural factors seem particularly likely to
influence FDI because FDI involves not only a transfer of foreign capital, but also a
lasting interest in the acquired company (see Bandelj, 2002). In other words, foreign
employees may act as knowledge brokers who transfer knowledge from where it is
known to where it is unknown (Paniagua and Sapena, 2013; Bergstrand et al., 2008).
Ethnic networks may also help to enforce contracts across national boundaries
(see Javorcik et al., 2011; Tong, 2005). As noted by Docquier and Lodigiani (2010),
ethnic networks create (or substitute for) trust in a weak international legal envir-
onment. Trust matters, especially in developing and emerging economies, where the
rule of law is weak. Thus, networks provide community enforcement of contracts.
Migrants may also act as business developers. Such migrants are individuals of
a certain ethnicity who possess specific knowledge about how to conduct business in
countries associated with that ethnicity (see Foley and Kerr, 2013). The entrepren-
eur’s characteristics reside in ethnic resources built on trust and friendship arising
from social networking relationships with other entrepreneurs from the same ethnic
background (Rueda-Armengot and Peris-Ortiz, 2012)2. These resources may mater-
ialize through intangible outcomes (e.g., information, orientation and advice) and
tangible outcomes (e.g., financing), the latter constituting the focus of our analysis.
Individual case studies have identified evidence supporting these network effects.
The United States and China are probably the most extensively analysed case stud-
ies3. Our study provides additional insights into the FDI–migration link because, as
far as we know, only a handful of multi-country studies exist. Docquier and Lodigiani
(2010) analysed a sample of 150 countries between 1980 and 2000, and reported evid-
2See also the work by Saxenian (2002) on American transnational entrepreneurs.
3See Javorcik et al. (2011); Kugler and Rapoport (2007); Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008),
and Foad (2012) for analysis of US. Tong (2005) and Gao (2003) focused on the Chinese case. Other
countries’ experiences have also been analysed: Buch et al. (2006) (Germany), Gheasi et al. (2013)
(UK), and Murat and Pistoresi (2009) (Italy).
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ence that supports the existence of business network externalities mainly associated
with the skill diaspora. By using the stock of FDI-funded capital per worker as the
dependent variable, these authors found that a highly educated diaspora stimulates
physical capital accumulation. This effect is stronger for large countries. There-
fore, even if brain drain depresses the average schooling level, FDI is likely to rise.
Flisi and Murat (2011) stress that migrant networks develop transnational networks
whereby information on opportunities concerning the origin and destination econom-
ies circulates more easily and efficiently. Aubry et al. (2014) covered a sample of
203 countries for the period 2001–2006. Aubry et al.’s study was the first to in-
vestigate the relationship between trade, migration and FDI in a unified framework.
The study reported that migration helps to form business links that lead to FDI
project deployment in a particular location. If migrants become part of a business
community, a network can emerge whereby migrants liaise with potential investors
and partners seeking to establish a production facility in the migrants’ country of
origin4. In other words, migrants transmit information not only about distribution
(useful for both exports and FDI) but also about setting up a production facility
(useful for MNEs when locating their subsidiaries). Aubry et al.’s findings indicate
that the ratio of FDI to exports is higher when there is a higher stock of migrants in
the exporting country, if that country is also the home country for multinational in-
vestment. Thus, although migration positively affects both trade and FDI (in terms
of both the extensive and intensive margins), the effect on FDI is greater5.
The above studies have reported an FDI–migration link as evidence supporting
4According to these authors, while this channel seems to apply mainly to skilled migrants,
unskilled migrants may also contribute, through other channels, to relaxing information constraints
on FDI: participation in the destination country’s labour force reveals information about the worker
characteristics in the home country, thereby reducing uncertainty about FDI. Hence, both skilled
and unskilled migration can convey information to facilitate FDI inflow to the home country.
5Ivlevs and De Mello (2010) also analysed trade, FDI and migration in a unified framework
from migration-sending countries’ perspective. Results for a sample of 103 countries indicate that
if exports are low-skill intensive, emigration of highly skilled labour leads to positive FDI.
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positive network externalities based on the information advantage of migrants and
strong family and cultural ties to their homeland. However, the channel through
which this information affects investment decisions remains mostly unexplored. In
the FDI literature, headquarter services constitute the usual mechanism for the intra-
firm transfer of management, marketing and financial information needed for foreign
production. Initially, these headquarter services were basically understood as blue-
prints developed by the headquarters in the source country (Helpman, 1984). Today,
headquarter services are the focus of a burgeoning strand of research because they
explain how firms may absorb foreign costs and engage in FDI (Antra`s and Helpman
2004).
A key issue is the firm’s decision regarding where to locate the headquarter ser-
vices. Davies (2005) argued that firms have incentives to spread headquarter services
across countries to benefit from the imperfect substitution of labour from different
countries. However, empirical research has shown that advantages for firms come
from the separation of headquarter services and production activities. Thus, Davis
and Henderson (2008) concluded that headquarter services tend to agglomerate in
certain locations. This agglomeration allows firms to use the abundant human capital
in those locations. In addition, agglomeration itself generates information spillovers
among firms6. This decision, however, is costly in terms of communication and co-
ordination costs (Henderson and Ono, 2008). Empirical evidence fails to provide a
conclusive answer to the question of how to solve this trade-off. Whereas Strauss-
Kahn and Vives (2009) showed that firms are increasingly locating their headquarters
in metropolitan areas with good business services, Cristea (2015) found that low com-
munication costs mean that firms prefer to locate headquarter services in countries
6Lovely et al (2005), for instance, found that headquarter services for exporter firms tend to be
more agglomerated than other firms because their information requirements are more difficult to
find.
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with an abundance of low-skilled labour rather that export to these countries.
The foreign subsidiary usually pays a lower price than domestic firms for some
business activities. Financial or marketing services profit from economies of scale
when centralized at the firm’s headquarters. For example, headquarter services al-
low the subsidiary to reinvest in the foreign market at a lower cost (Paniagua, 2015).
However, the transfers of these services also entail transaction costs related to com-
munication costs between headquarters and the affiliate. Evidence suggests that
migrants networks are heavily involved in activities related to headquarters services
like wholesaling, financing, sourcing, and transport (Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996).
Therefore, migrants living in the countries where headquarter services are located
could mitigate the transaction costs of transferring these services, specifically finance
services.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) reported that countries’ financial development is rel-
evant for financially constrained firms. Developed financial markets provide firms
with access to the capital they need to invest in projects they might otherwise have
to forego (Di Giovanni, 2005). Conversely, underdeveloped financial markets may
constrain potential entrepreneurs (Alfaro et al., 2004). As highlighted by He´ricourt
and Poncet (2009, p.2), efficient investment “only results when businesses do not face
credit constraints which are unrelated to their own performance”. These authors re-
ported that cross-border relationships between Chinese and foreign firms help private
domestic firms to bypass the financial and legal obstacles they face at home. Thus,
firms may need external financing to face the costs of entering foreign markets and
expanding the business (Buch et al., 2014).
Yet financial constraints matter for certain firms only. Kroszner et al. (2007)
reported two important findings regarding this point. First, during a banking crisis,
value added contracts in those sectors that depend more on external financing.
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Second, reduction in value added is greater in countries whose financial markets
are more evolved. Buch et al. (2014) reported similar results. Financial constraints
have a greater effect on larger and/or more productive firms that are more likely to
engage in FDI decisions.
We believe that credit constraints following the 2007 financial crisis constitute a
relevant context for our analysis. As stated by Campello et al. (2010), the systemic
financial crisis that began in 2007 has forced financially constrained firms to drop
investment projects,whereas unconstrained firms have been able to continue with
such projects. Similarly, Buch et al. (2014) reported that after the 2007 crisis, an
increasing number of German firms have cited credit constraints as an impediment
to expansion into foreign countries. Prior to the crisis, Alba et al. (2007) studied
Japanese FDI in the U.S., finding that multiple rating downgrades of Japanese banks
significantly affected the rate of FDI in firms whose main financial sources were these
downgraded banks. Gil Pareja et al. (2013) showed that credit constraints derived
from systemic financial crises primarily affect FDI’s extensive margin.
Therefore, because of the credit shortages following the 2007 financial crisis, we
examine the role of migrants as a source of information about alternative financing
options capable of offsetting the impact of credit constraints. Moreover, because
these constraints may elevate the threshold for the required investment, firm het-
erogeneity matters. Thus, we examine whether the effectiveness of this new mi-
grant–FDI mechanism varies depending on the FDI project’s size.
3 Theoretical framework
In this section, we derive an estimable equation with predictions on the joint effect
of migration and financial constraints on FDI. The model closely follows standard
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trade and FDI setups like those described by Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2008),
Manova (2013), and Crino` and Ogliari (2015).
The setup
We start with a world of J countries, represented by i, j = 1, ..., J . As is com-
mon practice with FDI gravity models (e.g., Kleinert and Toubal, 2010), the initial
setup starts with the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas utility function for variety-loving
consumers in the host country,
Uj = X
µ
AjX
1−µ
Bj , (1)
for a two sector economy with goods A and B, where µ is a sector-wide parameter
which describes the intensity of consumption of each good (0 < µ < 1). One of the
sectors (e.g., A) is a non-trade sector, whereas sector B is open to foreign entry. The
aggregate consumption of a good in the traded sector (we drop the subscript B for
simplicity Xj ≡ XBj) is a CES sub-utility function,
Xj =
[
xkj
αdk
]1/α
, (2)
where the host country j ’s consumption of good B produced by firm k from home
country i is denoted by xkij. The constant elasticity of substitution is σ ≡ (1−α)−1 >
1 and is equal for any product pair.
Maximization of (1) yields the following expression for the demand of the firm:
xj =
p−σj (1− µ)Yj
P 1−σj
,
where pj are the transfer prices for each good’s price and Pj is the price index in
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country j, which is assumed to be a CES function,
Pj =
[
k
pkij
1−σdk
]1/(1−σ)
. (3)
Foreign production
We assume that heterogeneous productivity splits the market between domestic,
exporting and investing firms (Helpman et al., 2004; Melitz, 2003). Country i has Ni
active monopolistic firms. Firms may attack the market by producing at home and
exporting or producing the goods in country j. The firm uses fi units of an input
bundle at a specific nationwide unit cost of ci. To enter the industry, exporters pay
a sunk cost of
fExij = cifij. (4)
Foreign production requires headquarter services, which increase the plant’s tech-
nological, organizational and financial capabilities (Antra`s and Helpman, 2004).
Firms tailor their products with services like R&D, innovation and marketing. There-
fore, they capture the knowledge of the headquarters of country j – its tastes in
products (demand) as well as labour and capital regulation and management (pro-
duction). Headquarter services are produced with labour at home. Headquarter
services also affect the quality of the goods produced. The basic setup, therefore, is
consistent with research by Crino` and Ogliari (2015) on export quality.
The plant uses these headquarter blueprints and combines capital and labour for
production. Headquarter services, however, entail additional fixed costs:
fHQij = cih
γ
ij, (5)
where h > 1 are the blueprints or units of HQ services, and γ > 0 is the elasticity of
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the fixed cost to headquarter services (HQ). A foreign investor pays both sunk costs
to enter the market:
fFDI ≡ fHQj + fExij .
Upon entry, the firm discovers its productivity 1/a, where a is the number of
units of headquarter services per input bundle used by the firm to produce one unit
of output. We follow the standard assumption that the distribution of a across firms
is a continuous Pareto c.d.f. G(a) with [a∗ij, aL], where 0 < aL < a
∗
ij. The density of
G(a) is denoted by g(a), and the distribution is the same across countries.
To produce a good in destination j, a firm in country i incurs a marginal cost,
MCij(a) = ωij
(
hijM
−ρ
ji
)δ
, ωij(a) ≡ τijcia, δ ∈ (0, 1) (6)
where τij > 1 is an iceberg-type cost paid to transfer headquarter services between
countries i and j, δ is the elasticity of the marginal cost to headquarter services
and ωkij(a) measures the marginal cost per blueprint. Mji > 1 is a measure of
migrant information flows between countries and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of migrant
information that affects headquarter service provision. Therefore, ρδ is the elasticity
of the marginal cost to migration.
Migrants increase the information flow between countries. Migrants living in
country i but born in country j increase the knowledge about tastes and reduce
management costs. In sectors where headquarter services are irrelevant to the mar-
ginal cost of production (δ = 0) or where migrants have no effect on alleviating the
marginal costs of headquarter services (ρ = 0), however, the effect of migration is
neutral. Intuitively, we can think of these as complex sectors with a high number
of headquarter services. For firms in these sectors, the cost of additional services is
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lower than for firms producing simple products requiring only a few services from
the parent firm. It is plausible that the effect of migration may be lower for complex
products than for simple products.
The firm problem
The firm chooses pij and hij to maximize its profits in destination j according to
the following equation:
max
p,h
((pij −MCij(a))xij − fFDI) (7)
Hence, the optimal price, headquarter services and affiliate sales are given by:
poij =
ωij(a)h
δ
ij
M δρji α
(8)
hoij =
( ωkij(a)
M δρji αPj
)1−σ
(1− µ)(γ˜ − γ)Yj
σγci
1/γ˜ (9)
ASoij = pij·xij =
σγcki
(γ˜ − γ)
( ωij(a)
M δρji αPj
)1−σ
(1− µ)(γ˜ − γ)Yj
σγci
γ/γ˜ (10)
where γ˜ ≡ γ − δ(1 − σ) > 0 by the second-order condition. The superscript o
means that these quantities are the unconstrained optimal. Applying the zero profit
condition to (7) yields the following equation for the investment of the firm (the total
sunk cost):
fFDI
o
=
γcki
(γ˜ − γ)
( ωij(a)
M δρji αPj
)1−σ
(1− µ)(γ˜ − γ)Yj
σγcki

γ/γ˜
= ASokij/σ. (11)
13
Equation (11) shows that the foreign capital needed to enter the market is a
fraction of the affiliate sales in the foreign market. The effect of migration on FDI is
clearly positive because ∂f
FDIo
∂Mji
> 0.
Firms from country i invest in destination j as long as the profits exceed the
entry cost. All firms with productivity a ∈ [aL, a∗ij] enter the market. Hence, the
least productive firm meets the following equation:
fFDI(a∗ij)− fHQij (a∗ij) = fExij .
The solution for the cut-off productivity is given by:
a∗ij =
(
σcifij
(γ/γ˜)
) γ˜
γ(1−σ)
(
γ − γ˜
σγci
) 1−δ
γ
((1− µ)Yj)
1
σ−1
M δρji αPj
τijci
. (12)
Only a fraction G(a∗kij) of the active firms invest in country j. The effect of
migration on the extensive margin is also positive because
∂a∗kij
∂Mji
> 0.
Migration and financial constraints
We assume that a fraction of the investment must be borne up front. A firm
from FDI source country i must borrow from an external source (e.g., a bank) to
invest in country j. Manova (2013) assumed that part of the sunk cost is invested in
tangible assets and can be collateralized. In this study, however, headquarter services
are intangible assets. We therefore assume that the firm borrows a fraction of its
investment. As is standard in the literature, a country measure captures the degree
of financial contractability λi ∈ [0, 1]. Firms in countries with perfect contractability
(λi = 1) have no financial constraints for their investment. With a probability of
1− λi, the contract is not enforced and depending on their productivity, some firms
will be unable to invest.
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In the standard setup, we allow firms to negotiate with banks from country i or
j. According to the empirical evidence, simultaneous banking crises decrease FDI
(Gil-Pareja et al., 2013). We use the setup proposed by Antra`s and Foley (2015) and
define the sales of a liquidity constrained affiliate:
max
p,h
(Λ−dsij (pij −MCcij(a))xij − fFDI) (13)
where Λ−1ij = (λj + (1− λj)ε)(λi + (1− λi)ε) is a measure of the financial instability
in the pair of countries and ds ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of the investment that
is borrowed from banks. Revenues are shaved by a fraction ε ∈ [0, 1]. Firms that are
financially unconstrained (ds = 0) or prefect contractability (λj = 1) are unaffected
by Λij.
In addition, we assume that banking crises interfere with the transmission of
knowledge provided by migrants. In other words, migrants’ contribution to reducing
the marginal cost in FDI source countries with weak financial contractability or
systemic banking crises is greater than in other source countries. The following
expression captures this idea:
MCcij(a) = ωijh
δ
ij
(
Mji
(
Λi
Λj
)−η)−δρ
, (14)
where Λi and Λj are the country measures of financial instability and η ∈ [0, 1] is
the extent of financial information provided by migrants. When migrants provide no
financial information, η = 0, and expressions (14) and (6) are equivalent.
Equation (14) reveals two offsetting effects regarding the effect of financial con-
straints and migrants’ on FDI. Firstly, financial frictions in country i (FDI source
country) augment the positive effect of migration on FDI7. Secondly, financial fric-
7Or from a different perspective migrants reduce the negative effect of financial constraints in
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tions in country j (FDI host country) reduce the positive effect of migration on FDI8.
These effects are higher when migrant elasticity (ρ) is higher and when the degree
of financial frictions are higher (for example during a banking crisis).
To gain intuition on these effects, let country i be Thailand (FDI source) and
country j China (FDI destination). Consider now a Thai firm that needs external
finance to invest in a plant in China. In the event of a systemic banking crisis
in Thailand, our firm has extreme difficulties to find finance at home (country i).
Casual evidence suggests that Chinese migrants living in Thailand play an active role
in Thailand’s investment in China (for instance through the aforementioned Bamboo
network). However, the effect of Chinese migrants (e.g., providing information and
contacts in China) might be lower if the financial system in China collapses.
The new headquarter services and affiliate sales of a constrained firm are derived
from equations (8) and (9):
hcij =
(
Λ−dsij
(
Λj
Λi
)(1−σ)ηδρ)1/γ˜
hcij (15)
AScij =
(
Λ−dsij
(
Λj
Λi
)(1−σ)ηδρ)γ/γ˜
ASoij. (16)
Some firms may lower the headquarter services needed for production (and hence
may also lower revenues) and still enter the market. The solution for the cut-off
productivity for constrained firms is given by:
a¯ij = Λ
−ds
σ−1
ij
(
Λj
Λi
)−ηδρ
a∗ij (17)
Equation (16) shows that the investment of a constrained firm is lower than that
country i on FDI.
8Or from a different perspective migrants increase the negative effect of financial constraints in
country j on FDI.
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of an unconstrained firm because
(
Λ−dsij
(
Λj
Λi
)(1−σ)δηρ)γ/γ˜
< 1. Such an effect is the
result of financial constraints in both countries. Financial constraints in the host
country reduce the positive effect of migrants on FDI. Equation (17) shows that he
effect of banking crises on the extensive margin is negative because Λ
−ds
σ−1
ij
(
Λj
Λi
)−ηδρ
<
1 and less firms enter the market.
Multiple firms
Aggregating across firms yields the aggregate capital investment:
˜FDI ij = Ni
 a¯ij
aL
AScij(a)
σ
g(a)
G(a¯ij)
da =
= Ni
γcki
(γ˜ − γ)
Λ−dsij (ΛjΛi
)(1−σ)ηδρ(
τijci
M δρji αPj
)1−σ
(1− µ)(γ˜ − γ)Yj
σγci
γ/γ˜  a¯ij
aL
a(1−σ)γ/γ˜
g(a)
G(a¯ij)
da.
(18)
We can re-write equation (18) as follows:
˜FDI = Ni
AScij(aL)
σ
Vij, (19)
where
Vij ≡
 a¯ij
aL
(
a
aL
)(1−σ)γ/γ˜
g(a)
G(a¯ij)
da,
and
AScij(aL) =
γcki
(γ˜ − γ)
Λ−dsij (ΛjΛi
)(1−σ)ηδρ(
τijciaL
M δρji αPj
)1−σ
(1− µ)(γ˜ − γ)Yj
σγci
γ/γ˜ .
(20)
Equation (20) captures the sales of the most productive firm. As stated earlier,
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we assume that 1/a follows a Pareto distribution. We define G(a) =
aκ−aκL
aκH−aκL , with
κ > (σ − 1)γ/γ˜. Therefore, we can re-write Vij as:
Vij =
(γ˜/γ)κ
(γ˜/γ)κ− σ + 1Wij, (21)
where
Wij ≡ max

(
a¯ij
aL
)κ−(σ−1)γ/γ˜
− 1(
a¯ij
aL
)κ
− 1
, 0
 . (22)
The selection of firms into FDI, represented by Wij, is controlled by the cut-off
variable a¯ij in (17). Using this expression, we can obtain a log-linear and estimable
equation from (19):
fdiij = θ0 + ni +
γ
γ˜
yj +
γ(σ − 1)
γ˜
pj − γσ
γ˜
ci − γ(σ − 1)
γ˜
ln τij +
+
γρ(σ − 1)
γ˜
mji − γ
γ˜
ds ln Λij − γρ(σ − 1)δη
γ˜
ln
Λj
Λi
+ wij, (23)
where lower case variables are the natural log of the upper case variables and θ0 is a
constant that bundles the rest of parameters. Using a standard parametrization for
the transfer cost yields:
γ(σ − 1)
γ˜
ln τij = ζdij − uij, (24)
where dij is the log of bilateral distance between countries and uij ∼ N(0, σ2u) is an
unobserved i.i.d. variable representing investment frictions. By adopting standard
notation, we can obtain an empirical gravity-like equation:
fdiij = θ0 + si + sj − ζdij − γ
γ˜
ds ln Λij +
γρ(σ − 1)δ
γ˜
(mji− η ln Λj
Λi
) +wij + uij, (25)
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where si ≡ ni − γσγ˜ ci and sj ≡ γγ˜yj + γ(σ−1)γ˜ pj are country fixed effects.
From equation (25), we derive three interesting predictions for empirical testing:
1. Bilateral migration from country j to country i increases the FDI from country
i to country j.
2. Financial frictions in country j (Λj) reduce the positive effect of migration on
FDI.
3. Financial frictions in country i (Λi) increase the positive effect of migration on
FDI.
4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Data
We estimate an extended gravity version of equation (25) to explain bilateral
FDI from the migrant’s host country to the migrant’s country of origin and test
the implications above. As is customary within the gravity framework, the extent of
FDI flows between country pairs is directly proportional to their economic mass (i.e.,
GDP) and decreases with distance. The basic specification also includes other factors
that affect cross-border investments. We extend this set of variables by including the
number of migrants and a dummy variable that captures the existence of friction in
financial markets. Table 1 describes the variables measuring these factors.
[Table 1 about here.]
We provide the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix in Table 2. The
correlation of migration with the rest of variables is below 0.5 in all cases. The
highest correlation is with FDI and projects.
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[Table 2 about here.]
The FDI data set is taken from the Financial Times Ltd. cross-border investment
monitor (FDIMarkets, 2013). This data set covers bilateral firm-level greenfield
investments from 2003 to 2012, aggregated up to the national level. Greenfield
investments are optimal to measure migrant networks’ influence on multinational
enterprises’ (MNEs’) ability to procure credit. Greenfield investments imply higher
plant costs and tend to suffer from credit constraints (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; Qiu
and Wang, 2011). Furthermore, the investor has no investment footprint in the host
country, so migrants’ impact is expected to be greater9.
We measure investment counts from FDIMarkets in firm-level projects and cap-
ital flows in constant 2005 USD. Overall, the database is heavily unbalanced, with
70% zero observations showing that not all countries received investment in all years.
Table 3 displays the distribution of projects by firm size (measured by turnover). Un-
surprisingly, firms are heterogeneous, and the number of investment projects carried
out by firms increases with their size. Thus, smaller firms undertook, on average,
1.6 projects between 2003 and 2012, whereas bigger firms undertook an average of
more than 80 in the same period. This difference reflects the differences in the
headquarter services required in each case. Smaller firms are less efficient at provid-
ing headquarter services and more sensitive to changes in the economic and financial
environment (Ibarra-Caton, 2015).
[Table 3 about here.]
We examine 140 host countries (migration source countries) and 12 source coun-
tries (migration destination) for which we could obtain bilateral migration data. We
use information on the foreign-born population by country of birth. These data come
9Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008) found that migrant impact on FDI is much stronger for FDI
than for foreign stock holdings.
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from the OECD International Migration Database (OECD, 2014). Table 4 lists the
countries included in this study.
[Table 4 about here.]
The World Bank (2013) provides GDP measured in constant 2005 USD. Dis-
tance, common language, colony and border come from the CEPII (2011) database.
These variables control for freight, information, cultural, historical and administrat-
ive transaction costs between country pairs10. We calculate an indicator for religious
affinities using data from the CIA World Factbook (2011), according to the following
formula for each country pair i, j :
∑
m
(Share of religious group m)i ∗ (Share of religious group m)j
where m = Christian,Muslim,Buddhist,Hindu, Jewish.
Institutional agreements such as free trade agreements (FTA) and bilateral in-
vestment treaties (BIT) reduce uncertainty in foreign investments (Bergstrand and
Egger, 2013). We construct BIT manually using data from UNCTAD (2013). FTA
data come from Head et al. (2010), complemented by UNCTAD (2013) data.
One key issue is being able to identify circumstances under which the role of mi-
grants becomes relevant. Our model assumes that alternative sources of information
become even more attractive when the traditional credit channels fail. Therefore, the
most common way for frictions in financial markets to appear is through systemic
financial crises. Such crises imply a collapse of the country’s financial markets, which
forces firms to seek alternative financing sources. Similar studies (Crino` and Ogliari,
10Religious affinities increase the probability of economic transactions between nations with
similar values and beliefs (Helble, 2007). This variable was introduced in the gravity equation by
Helpman et al. (2008) as a control variable for religious and common law affinities between trade
partners.
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2015; Kroszner et al., 2007; Gil-Pareja et al., 2013) have used banking crises as an
exogenous negative shock to the ability of the traditional financial system to provide
credit.
The data source on systemic banking crises is Laeven and Valencia (2013). These
authors built a database spanning the period 1970–2011. They identified banking
crises as events that simultaneously meet the following two conditions:
1. Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (significant bank
runs, losses in the banking system and/or bank liquidations)
2. Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant
losses in the banking system11.
Our FDI data set includes total FDI from country i to country j, but also the number
of FDI projects in country i targeting country j. Data availability allows for a richer
analysis of the effect of migration and financial frictions, permitting us to disentangle
the extensive margin and a sort of intensive margin of FDI.
4.2 Empirical method
Our baseline estimates include plain ordinary least squares (OLS), a two-stage
procedure proposed by Helpman et al. (2008, HMR henceforth) and the pseudo-
Poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyro
(2006). The OLS log version of the gravity equation incurs a self-selection bias,
stemming from omitting zeros. Both HMR and PPML address this issue. HMR deals
with zeros in a first probit stage, and PPML presents consistent estimates because
11These measures should include at least three of the following six: (1) deposit freezes and/or
bank holidays; (2) significant bank nationalizations; (3) bank restructuring gross costs; (4) extensive
liquidity support; (5) significant guarantees put in place; and (6) significant asset purchases.
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the estimator does not require log-linearization of the variables12. Furthermore,
Silva and Tenreyro (2015) showed that HMR imposes overly strict homoscedastic
restrictions on the error term, which are scarcely present in FDI or trade data. The
authors showed that the simpler PPML method yields similar results to the two-step
procedure.
As in HMR, we define the first stage as a probit estimation:
%ijt = Pr(Tijt = 1|Observed variables)
= Φ(βgravityij + β12BCijt + β13 ln (migrjit) +,
+β14 ln (migrjit) ∗BCit + β15 ln (migrjit) ∗BCjt +
+si + sj + st + ϑijt), (26)
where Tijt takes a value of 1 when country i invests in country j in year t and
zero if the value is zero, Φ(.) is the cumulative normal standard distribution func-
tion, and s are the fixed effects for host and home countries and year. gravityij =
β1 ln (Yit ∗ Yjt)+β2 ln (Dij)+β3borderij+β4colonyij+β5langij+β6smctryij+β7relij+
β8lockedj+β10BITijt+β11FTAijt captures the distance as well as other transfer cost
variables described in Table (1). The term migrjit is the yearly stock of migrants
from country j who live in country i, BCijt is the number of countries that suffer
systemic financial crises in year t (0, 1 or 2), BCit is a dummy set to 1 if the home
country suffers a systemic financial crisis, BCjt is a dummy set to 1 if the host coun-
try suffers a systemic financial crisis, λt is a fixed year effect and eijt represents a
stochastic error term. Coefficients βˆ14 and βˆ15 give a measure of the degree by which
migrants transmit financial information (η in our model). Our model predicts that
12Moreover, it is robust to heteroscedasticity in the error term and it assures convergence of
the maximum likelihood estimation by a previous inspection of the data (Silva & Tenreyro, 2010,
2011). Additionally, Bergstrand et al. (2015) argued that the PPML estimator is appropriate for
short panel gravity data.
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βˆ14 = −βˆ15. In this specification, however, we are implicitly allowing for a different
impact in host and home countries. Nonetheless, we expect that βˆ14 > 0 and βˆ15 < 0.
The error term, which is correlated with the error term of the gravity equation, is
denoted by ϑijt.
The second step runs a log-likelihood maximization estimation and includes vari-
ables that control for non-random firm selection (zeros) and firm heterogeneity13:
lnFDIijt = βgravityij + β12BCijt + β13 ln (migrjit) +
+β14 ln (migrjit) ∗BCit + β15 ln (migrjit) ∗BCjt
+si + sj + st + ˆ¯w(κ) + θ
ˆ¯ϑijt + vijt, (27)
where FDIijt is the aggregate investment between home country i and host j in
year t, ˆ¯ϑ∗ijt = φ(zˆijt)/Φ(zˆijt) is the inverse Mills ratio, zˆ
∗
ijt = Φ
−1(%ˆijt) . %ˆijt are the
the probabilities obtained in the first probit step of equation (26), and φ(.) is the
standard normal density function14. ˆ¯w(κ) is defined as:
ˆ¯w(κ) = ln
exp
[
κ1(zˆ
∗
ijt +
ˆ¯ϑ∗ijt)
]
− 1
exp
[
κ2(zˆ∗ijt +
ˆ¯ϑ∗ijt)
]
− 1
 ,
where κ1 and κ2 are the parameters obtained from (22). The parameter ˆ¯w(κ) affects
both firm selection and firm heterogeneity.
13For identification, this step excludes variables that affect the probability of FDI but not FDI’s
volume. HMR proposes to drop religion to drop religion (for trade).
14Following HMR, some dyads are such that their probability of investment is indistinguishable
from 1. The inverse Mills ratio would be undefined for predicted probabilities close to 1, therefore
all probabilities > 0.9999999 are converted to equal 0.9999999.
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5 Results and discussion
Table 5 presents the results for the estimation of the augmented gravity equation
for Tijt (the probability of FDI) (column 1), FDI flows (columns 2–6) and extens-
ive margin (columns 7–10). The plain ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for
gravity equations suffers from several well-known biases. The first such bias is mis-
specification due to the omission of multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and Van
Wincoop, 2003). The usual solution for this type of bias involves introducing coun-
try fixed effects (CFE) for both host and home countries. Nevertheless, CFE does
not eliminate unobserved bilateral heterogeneity because it fails to consider vari-
ables apart from the country pair level that might affect bilateral FDI. When we add
country-pair fixed effects (CPFE), we eliminate all dyadic variables with no time
variation. Specifically, the CPFE comprises only GDP, BIT, FTA and migration15.
For the extensive margin we use the number of firm-level projects as the de-
pendent variable. The incorporation of trade and FDI margins reduces the over-
aggregation bias of capital flows in the estimation of the gravity equation (Hillberry,
2002; Hillberry & Hummels, 2008). The extensive margin reveals information about
the creation of new partners (Felbermayr and Kohler, 2006).
There are no major differences between the two equations in terms of significance
and direction of effect for most explanatory variables. A general result is that GDP
is not significant in any model (except the PPML estimate). Bilateral treaties have
an unexpected negative effect both on total FDI and the number of project, the
same as free trade agreements, when heterogeneity is dealt with fixed country effects
(the only exception being the OLS estimate in column 3). However, the inclusion of
country-pair fixed effects implies both estimates turn out to have a positive impact
on the number of projects. For number of projects, a positive effect appears when
15HMR did not converge with CPFE.
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country-pair fixed effects are included in the estimation. Regarding the standard
bilateral equation in the gravity equation, we observe that distance, common lan-
guage and former colony relationships are significant and have the expected signs
in all cases. Conversely, being part of the same country in the past or sharing a
common religion never affect the dependent variables. Being a landlocked country is
significant for total volume of FDI, whereas sharing a border affects only the number
of FDI projects. The border effect displays positive sign in the first stage of the
HMR procedure and a negative sign in the second one; however, we have already
explained the drawback with this estimation method that makes us prefer the PPML
procedure. All variables are dropped in the estimates with country-pair fixed effects.
[Table 5 about here.]
We observe certain heterogeneity in migrant’s positive effect in FDI. This effect
is greater in the PPML estimate because this method uses zeros to include inform-
ation about less productive firms. Furthermore, we observe differences between FDI
flows and the extensive margin. Our findings imply that migrant’s effect on FDI
is mainly driven by the extensive margin. In fact, once the heterogeneity has been
controlled with country-pair fixed effect, migration is only positive and significant
for the number of projects in column 10 (although at 10% level). These findings
imply that migrants affects firms’ decisions to engage in new FDI projects (extensive
margin) much more than it affects total FDI flows. Finally, the non-significance of
BC implies that major financial crises do not seem to influence international capital
flows for the subset of countries included in the regression16.
The results herein show that migrants help to promote FDI, however these results
do not show yet whether the migrant effect relates to the way financial markets
operate. Therefore, we explore now whether financial frictions, which are likely to
16For empirical evidence related to the global effect of BC refer to Gil-Pareja et al. (2013).
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force MNE aiming to invest abroad to explore additional funding opportunities, may
interact with migrants’ effect on FDI. We do so by introducing an interaction term
between the number of migrants and the BC variable. We consider the impact of a
crisis in the host country (BCjt) and in the home country (BCit). Table 6 presents
the outcomes, showing only results for variables of interest17.
[Table 6 about here.]
As observed in the baseline results, a systemic financial crisis does not per se
affect the total volume of FDI, but rather the existence of FDI. Financial frictions,
however, are crucial to determine the direction of the effect of migrants. Two ba-
sic asymmetries can be identified in reference to the impact of migrants when they
interact with financial frictions. First, frictions in the FDI source country imply
that firms must look for additional financial resources. Migrants may provide useful
information in this context. Thus, in situations of financial frictions, migrants affect
the probability of investment more than they do in the absence of frictions. Con-
versely, if the financial crisis happens in the migrants’ homeland, their information
is less valuable and, therefore, their impact is smaller18. Second, although migrants
seemingly provide information that helps the firm to decide whether to proceed with
an investment project, migrants seem not to affect the project’s size. The simple an-
swer to this question is that firm heterogeneity matters. Total FDI from one country
is the sum of very different investments by heterogeneous firms. Under these cir-
cumstances, the theoretical framework developed in section 3 predicts that financial
constraints have a stronger effect on less productive firms. Thus, below a certain
17The remaining estimates are available upon request.
18With regard to our preferred PPML estimates, the net effect of migrants is the sum of the
migrant’s estimated coefficient (0.219) and the estimated value of the interaction term (-0.041).
In this case, the net effect of migrants is still positive but comparatively lower in the event of a
banking crisis in their homeland. In the case of the probit estimates, the net effect of migrants is
close to zero.
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productivity threshold, firms do not enter the foreign market. In our setup, migrants
help borderline cases to cross borders. Therefore, we should expect a greater impact
on small projects.
To test this last assumption’s validity, we test the effects of migration across
different FDI levels using quantile regression. We follow the method set forth by
Paniagua et al. (2015), who developed a CPFE quantile regression procedure for
gravity estimates of FDI. Table 7 shows the results of this analysis.
[Table 7 about here.]
Results in Table 7 report the quantile regression results. Focusing on the variables
of interest, the results shed light on some interesting patterns that remained hidden
in our previous estimates.
First, the incidence of migration is quite steady across quantiles. That is, mi-
gration has a homogeneous effect at different FDI levels. Second, systemic financial
crises affect the median. In contrast, migrants in home countries i with systemic
financial crises positively affect only the lower FDI level, where less productive firms
are expected to be. Size makes firms particularly dependent on personal contacts for
their investments abroad19. Regarding the effect of financial constraints in country
j, migrants have no significant effect on FDI. Finally, as in Paniagua et al. (2015),
the quantile estimates of FTA and BIT are more in line with economic intuition
than previous estimates. We also observe a negative incidence of the variable bank-
ing crises around the median. Firms at the upper and lower tails are resilient to
financial constraints. Figure 1 illustrates these effects.
[Figure 1 about here.]
19This evidence is consistent with findings reported by Murat and Pistoressi (2009) regarding
the prominent role of migrant networks in countries such as Italy with a large number of small and
medium-sized enterprises. A similar idea was highlighted by Eckstein (2013).
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The graphs in Figure 1 show how the estimated coefficients vary across quantiles.
The interaction between migrants and BC (in the last two boxes) decreases in the up-
per tail. Migrants’ financial brokerage is therefore more evident in country pairs with
smaller or fewer project flows between them. Additionally, quantile regressions solve
some puzzling issues like BIT’s persistent negative coefficient or the non-significant
impact of BC in OLS and PPML, since these two estimation methods capture mean
effects.
6 Conclusions
Improving the knowledge of the interplay among migration, FDI and financial
constraints is essential to understanding the way globalization affects modern eco-
nomies. The increasing importance of foreign workers – whether employees or entre-
preneurs – in the labour market has recently raised questions about their influence on
foreign investment. Empirical literature suggests that migrants normally have know-
ledge and experience about their home markets and can provide valuable information
that would otherwise be difficult to obtain.
This paper provides new insights into the impact of migrants on their home-
land. The paper is devoted to analysing a specific channel through which migrants
may affect FDI, namely their influence in reducing information costs associated with
headquarter services. By reducing the costs of transferring information between
headquarter and affiliates, migrants promote both FDI flows and foreign projects
in their country of origin. We assume that part of the information transmitted by
migrants relates to their home financial system. This type of knowledge may be
particularly relevant during banking crisis or periods of financial distress.
Our findings show that migrant networks are likely to reduce the effect of finan-
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cial constraints faced by foreign firms. This effect is more pronounced among new
investment projects whose approval would otherwise be unlikely. Nevertheless, our
results show that migrants’ ability to broaden financial alternatives available to for-
eign firms is mediated by two factors: first, by financial constraints in the migrant’s
country of origin, and second, by FDI level. Migrants have a greater effect on small
projects, which may be more sensitive to financial constraints than large projects
are.
In summary, in addition to reporting on the role of migrants in overcoming in-
formation barriers and enforcing contracts across national boundaries, this paper
provides insights into a new mechanism that may reinforce the migration–FDI link.
Specifically, results highlight a business gain associated with the role of migrants as
suppliers of financial information when MNEs cannot secure financing at home. Our
findings imply that migrants can contribute to a higher integration of their home
countries within the global economy through greater FDI presence. We thereby
provide evidence supporting the argument that migrants play a relevant and posit-
ive role in their home economies. These findings contribute to bringing the positive
effects of migration to the forefront of policymakers’ decision-making processes.
The main novelty of this paper has been to provide new insights into the effect
of financial crisis on the migration-FDI link without accounting by migrant’s het-
erogeneity. An interesting avenue for future research would be to focus on how the
migration-FDI link can be affected by both the educational attainment of migrants
as well as their occupation level.
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Table 1: Standard gravity variables
Gravity variables without time variation
ln (Dij) Logarithm of the distance in kilometres between country capitals
borderij Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when countries share a
common border, and 0 otherwise
colij Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the two countries have
ever had a colonial link, and 0 otherwise
langij Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if both countries share the
same official language
relij Composite index that measures the religious affinity between
country pairs, with values ranging from 0 to 1
smctryij Dummy variable that indicates if both countries were part of the
same country in the past
lockedij Variable equal to 1 if a country is landlocked
Gravity variables with time variation
ln (Yit ∗ Yjt) Logarithm of GDP in constant 2005 USD.
FTAijt Dummy variable that takes a value of one when both countries
have a free trade agreement in force
BIT ijt Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country pair has a
bilateral investment treaty in force
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Table 3: Foreign projects by parent company turnover
Turnover (mUSD) Parent companies (HQ) Projects HQ/projects
0–5 632 1031 1.63
5–50 869 2631 3.03
50–500 843 3586 4.25
500–5000 828 7149 8.63
5000–50,000 1301 19525 15.01
50,000+ 128 10298 80.45
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Table 4: List of Countries
FDI Home (migration destination)
Australia, Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Iceland,
Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United States.
FDI Host (migration source)
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Belgium, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote
d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macau, Macedonia FYR, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Vincent, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
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Table 7: Quantile Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.90)
ln (Yit ∗ Yjt) 0.333*** 0.321*** 0.288*** 0.261***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
BIT ijt -0.134* -0.0107 -0.0116 -0.106
(0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.068)
FTAijt 0.313*** 0.254*** 0.230*** 0.139
(0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10)
BCijt -0.373 -0.387* -0.0591 0.348
(0.32) (0.21) (0.22) (0.58)
ln (migrjit) 0.213*** 0.195*** 0.211*** 0.180***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln (migrjit) ∗BCit 0.0737** 0.062*** 0.029 -0.007
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
ln (migrjit) ∗BCjt 0.025 0.033 0.002 -0.034
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Observations 3148 3148 3148 3148
Country pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variable total FDI in logs
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Quantile graphs
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